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Eurasia, along with Africa, is the last big frontier of global 
integration for the 21st Century. While the previous two 
centuries were marked by rapid economic integration 
across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, this century will 
see a catch-up across the vast continental space of 
Eurasia, home to a majority of the world’s population 
and to the most dynamic of emerging market econo-
mies, and repository of much of the world’s natural 
resource wealth. 1
Central Asia and the Caucasus are centrally located 
on this super-continent. Their development will be one of 
the critical factors for the effective integration of Eurasia 
(Figure 1).  As a transit hub, as a source of energy and 
1  Paper prepared for the First Eurasian Emerging Market Forum in Thun, 
Switzerland, January 23-25, 2010. The author serves as Senior Economic Adviser to the 
First Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum. He was formerly the Vice President for Europe 
and Central Asia of the World Bank and is currently the Executive Director and Senior 
Fellow at the Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings in Washington, D.C., USA. 
Mr. Linn also serves as Special Adviser to the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
Program (CAREC). This paper is adapted from an earlier version presented by the author 
at a preparatory meeting for the Forum on January 31-Febuary 1, 2009 in Gerzensee, 
Switzerland. The author wants to acknowledge the comments of Harinder Kohli and of the 
participants of the Gerzensee meeting, but he remains solely responsible for the content 
of the paper.
other minerals, and as a potential source of stability 
or conflict, the role of this region is key. At the same 
time, Eurasian economic integration represents a major 
opportunity for Central Asia and the Caucasus, as it 
moves from being largely a land-locked region far from 
markets to one positioned at the core of a dynamic and 
rapidly connecting economic space with access to the 
major new markets and sources of finance, knowledge 
and power in the world.
The purpose of this note is to frame a range of key 
issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus2  and their 
partners in the international community for discussion at 
the First Eurasia Emerging Markets Forum. 
2   For the purposes of the First Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum Central 
Asia is defined to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Mongolia, Western China and Afghanistan are 
also treated at times as part of the geography and economy of Central Asia. These three 
countries are members of Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Forum (CAREC). 
For a brief summary of trends and prospects in Mongolia, see the box on p.4.
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The issues explored are the following:
1.  How severe is the current global financial and 
economic crisis and its impact on Central Asia 
and the Caucasus? 
2.  What are the implications of the Eurasian eco-
nomic integration process? 
3.  What are the need and potential for economic 
integration and cooperation in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus?
4.  How to reap maximum benefits from the 
region’s energy and water resources for the 
countries in the Central Asia and the Caucasus?
5.  How to facilitate trade and transit within the 
Central Asia and Caucasus region and with the 
major neighbors?
6.  What can be done to improve the private busi-
ness climate in Central Asia and the Caucasus?
7.  Other possible issues of concern.
For each of these issues, the paper presents a brief 
analysis and concludes with a set of questions for 
discussion. It draws on a number of background papers 
prepared for the First Eurasian Emerging Market Forum.
Issue 1: How severe is the impact of the cur-
rent global financial and economic crisis on 
Central Asia and the Caucasus?3  
During 2008 the world entered a severe economic crisis. 
Triggered by the sub-prime mortgage collapse in the 
United States following a cooling of the housing market 
in 2007, the emerging financial crisis quickly spread 
to the U.S. financial institutions and from there to the 
European financial markets. The emerging markets, 
which once had been deemed to have decoupled from 
the industrial market economic and financial dynam-
ics, were also drawn into the downward spiral. As a 
result the major stock markets lost half or more of their 
3    For a detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on the region, see Mitra 
(2009)
capitalization and many of the worlds premier financial 
institutions had to draw on the support of their govern-
ments to survive. 
As the financial system deleveraged itself painfully 
and asset values dropped, the real economies began 
to suffer from a lack of credit, from drops in investment, 
consumer and export demand, and from plummet-
ing commodity prices. Economic growth dramatically 
dropped from the high levels experienced from 2003 to 
2007.  IMF projections for 2009 and 2010 as of October 
2009 (IMF 2009) show that the growth of the world 
economy in 2009 will be have been negative at -1.1 
percent, while advanced economies are expected to 
contract by – 3.4 percent and Russia by -7.5%. The IMF 
also predicts a recovery of the world economy in 2010, 
with world output projected to grow at 3.1%, led by the 
emerging market economies, especially China and India. 
However, there remain risks that the recovery will slow or 
will not be sustained. 
As a sign of the changing times and shifting global 
economic weights, outgoing U.S. President Bush 
convened the first-ever G20 summit in Washington on 
November 15, 2008, now in effect replacing the G8 
as the apex of global governance institutions. With 
follow-up G20 summits in London and Pittsburgh during 
2009 an ambitious agenda of joint crisis response by 
the leading economies in the world – including counter-
cyclical fiscal action, improved supervision and regula-
tion of cross-border risk exposure of major international 
financial institutions, a strengthening of the International 
Monetary Fund and Financial Stability Forum, and an 
agreement to establish the G-20 summit on a permanent 
basis – there is hope that the new summit forum will be 
more effective than the G8 in the past in addressing the 
current economic crisis and long-term challenges facing 
the world (Bradford and Linn, 2009).
Between 2000 and 2008 the economies of Central 
Asian and the Caucasus had experienced rapid eco-
nomic growth, more rapid than most other developing 
country regions. A combination of factors supported 

























































degree for each country: a rebound from the severe 
recession caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and by the Russia financial crisis of 1998; high natural 
resource prices; rapid growth of trade and investment 
driven in part by strong growth of China and Russia; a 
rapid increase in receipts from migrant remittances; and, 
with some notable exceptions, economic reforms and 
improvements in economic management. 
The outstanding economic performance of the 
region received a jolt in August 2007, when Kazakhstan 
was one of the first emerging market economies to 
feel the impact of the incipient world financial crisis. 
When US and European banks pulled back from over-
extended positions after the sub-prime bubble burst 
in the US, Kazakh banks, which had borrowed heavily 
in international markets, faced difficulties in refinancing 
themselves. This in turn slowed the economic boom of 
Kazakhstan, whose economy had shown signs of over-
heating already in 2006 with rapid wage and real estate 
inflation and negative real interest rates. The impact of 
the Kazakh economic slow-down was felt throughout 
much of the region, as Kazakh banks had expanded 
their presence rapidly through 2007, especially in 
Georgia and Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan had 
attracted migrants from the rest of the region in growing 
numbers. 
While Kazakhstan was able to avoid a full-blown 
crisis in 2007 and early 2008, all of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus were seriously affected by the world-wide 
financial and economic crisis of 2008/9. Many of the fac-
tors which had driven the region’s expansion until 2008 
went into reverse: Energy and minerals prices dropped 
precipitously, China’s and Russia’s growth engines 
slowed down or reversed, migrant workers in Russia 
were laid off, foreign direct investment dropped off. The 
short war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 
created additional disruptions and uncertainties for the 
Caucasus sub-region at the outset of the crisis.
On average the impact of the global crisis on the 
Central Asia and Caucasus region was less severe than 
for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) as a whole (the CIS is expected to have 
experienced negative growth of -7 percent in 2009). 
But perhaps the most striking aspect of the crisis is the 
vastly differing impact across the region, showing what 
great differences have emerged among the economies 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus twenty years after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Despite the substantial drop in energy prices, energy 
exporters in the region were less severely affected by 
the global crisis than energy importers, partly because 
the former were shielded by long-term gas price con-
tracts and had ample reserves with which to finance 
countercyclical spending. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan 
are projected by the IMF to have grown by some 7 
percent and Turkmenistan at 4 percent in 2009, while 
Kazakhstan’s economy declined by 2 percent due 
to the overhang of its financial problems. Among the 
energy importers, Armenia has been hit hardest, with a 
projected decline by 16 percent in 2009, while Georgia’s 
economy dropped by 4 percent. Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan, the region’s poorest countries, are expected 
to show growth rates of about 2 percent, better than 
feared at the outset of the crisis, but still a substantial 
drop in growth from the preceding decade and resulting 
in a slight decline in per capita income.4  
The recovery projected for 2010 will similarly differ 
across countries: While energy exporters are expected 
to grow at over 5 percent on average, energy import-
ers will likely grow only at some 2 percent. (IMF, 2009) 
Energy exporters will benefit from the recovery of oil and 
gas prices, while energy importers will be affected by 
the slow recovery projected for Russia (only 1.5 percent 
in 2010) and hence the lagging recovery of trade and 
remittances. Accordingly, the social stress caused by 
the crisis will continue to linger especially in the poorer 
countries of the region and with it political risks will con-
tinue to face many of the governments in the region.
The international community responded to vary-
ing degrees and in different ways: The IMF provided 
support to four countries under new or augmented 
























































programs (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan) in 2009 and multilateral and bilateral donors 
offered enhanced budget support to these same four 
countries ranging from under 1 percent in Armenia 
to almost 6 percent in Kyrgyz Republic. (IMF 2009) In 
addition, Russia provided bilateral support to some 
countries in the region (esp. Kyrgyz Republic). China 
supported Kazakhstan with a sizeable line of credit. And 
donors pledged support for a large program of post-war 
reconstruction of Georgia.  For the future, Mitra (2009) 
argues that more concessional funding is needed to 
support the poorer countries in the region and to allow 
them to develop and implement adequate social safety 
net program along with continued structural reforms for 
enhanced competitiveness.
The world and the countries in the Central Asia and 
Caucasus region now face five key questions:
1.  How rapid and sustained will be the global 
economic recovery and how effective global 
action in addressing the causes of the crisis and 
preventing future recurrences?
2.  How can the countries of Central Asian and 
the Caucasus countries best cope with the 
impact of the economic crisis in terms of policy 
response and in mitigating the social and politi-
cal consequences?
3.  How can the international community continue 
to help the poorest and most affected countries 
(especially Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan) to adjust to the crisis?
4.  What will be the impact on the domestic political 
stability in each country?
5.  How will the countries’ readiness to cooperate 
with each other be affected by the current eco-
nomic crisis? 
Mongolia (population of 2.6 million) is wedged between China and Russia with no direct links to other Central Asian coun-
tries. Like the rest of Central Asia it experienced rapid economic growth after 2000, benefitting from the dynamism of its 
two neighbors. With its heavy dependence on agriculture and mineral exports, Mongolia was seriously affected by the glo-
bal economic crisis, with growth in 2009 expected to have dropped to under 1 percent from 9 percent in 2008. In the face 
of a lingering banking crisis, drastic reductions in tax revenues and only limited fiscal and financial reserves, the country had 
to slash budgetary spending and turn to the IMF and other IFIs for assistance. These economic hardships compounded a 
political crisis following national elections in 2008, when violence erupted in the streets of the capital city. The recovery of 
commodity prices and the continued high growth in China are expected to higher growth in 2010 and 2011, but it may well 
remain in the neighborhood of 2-3 percent. One of the upsides of Mongolia’s economic prospects is the recent agreement 
with Ivanhoe, the Canadian mining company, to develop Mongolia’s copper and gold resources. However, the financial and 
economic benefits of the expected investments will take time to materialize and will bring with them the risks of a commod-
ity export boom. It is encouraging that the government is exploring the establishment of a natural resource fund with the 
assistance of the World Bank. As part of the transport and trade facilitation action program agreed under the Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), Mongolia expects to improve its transport and trade access to Russia 
and China, and through them to Central Asia and the rest of the world. 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2009


























































Issue 2: What are the implications of the 
Eurasian economic integration process? 
The Eurasian super-continent is home to a large majority 
of the world’s population, produces more than half of 
the world’s GDP, contains much of the world’s energy 
resources, and currently has the most dynamic large 
emerging market economies on the globe (especially 
China and India).
However, only with the opening up of China in the 
1980s and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
the early 1990s did Eurasia begin a process of economic 
integration across the huge continental economic space. 
Before then the self-imposed isolation of China and the 
Soviet Union created serious obstacles – symbolized 
by the Bamboo and Iron Curtains. They prevented a 
participation of the continent in the post-World War 2 
globalization process, which instead was driven by the 
rapid growth of cross-oceanic links between Europe and 
the USA and between the USA and East and South East 
Asia.  Now, there is a rapid catching-up taking place 
across Eurasia (Linn and Tiomkin, 2006).5 This process 
of integration gives rise to great economic, political and 
institutional opportunities and challenges. 
Key issues that arise are:  how will the energy 
resources of Russia and Central Asia be developed, 
accessed and shared across the Eurasian continent, 
especially natural gas and hydro power; how will trans-
port and trade be integrated across the huge land space 
in competition with the traditional overseas transport and 
trading routes; how will capital markets be integrated 
and how effectively will capital flows, esp. private direct 
investment, be distributed and accessed; how will migra-
tory flows and remittances will be managed in the face 
of glaring demographic and economic differences; and 
how will the common threats of climate change, drug 
trade, conflict potential and terrorism be handled. 
One of the key challenges for the great continental 
5    There is some debate about how rapid will be this integration process. 
Richard Pomfret in his background paper for the First Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum 
expresses some skepticism about predictions of rapid integration due to the relatively 
high costs of overland transport.
powers will be to frame a political and institutional frame-
work that will allow inevitable differences in national 
interests to be mediated to ensure that they do not 
prevent mutually beneficial integration of the continent or 
result in open conflict. In some regards, the combination 
of economic and political forces which Eurasia faces 
today is not dissimilar to the challenge which Europe 
faced a hundred years ago.
Questions for further exploration include the 
following:
•	 What are the prospects for Eurasian economic 
integration and its significance for global eco-
nomic and political development?
•	 What can be done to make Eurasian economic 
integration a productive and peaceful process?
•	 Are there institutional initiatives that could support 
the Eurasian integration process?
•	 What aspects of this process should future 
Eurasian Emerging Market Forums address?
Issue 3: What are the need and potential for 
economic integration and cooperation of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus?
The Central Asia and Caucasus region lies geographi-
cally at the center of Eurasia. It has a population of about 
80 million and is relatively poor. Its political and eco-
nomic weight is quite limited.  Conventional wisdom is 
to view the region as largely land-locked and far from 
seaports and hence that it faces huge, perhaps insuper-
able problems of access to markets. (See Figure 2 from 
World Development Report 2009.) 
Therefore, the stability and prosperity of the Central 
Asia and Caucasus region is of great interest for all the 
major Eurasian neighbors. If it were to descend into 
conflict or see the emergence of failed states, this would 
present Eurasia as a whole with serious challenges and 
would certainly impede the transcontinental integration 
process. By the same token, the countries of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus can substantially benefit from 
























































place effective policies, physical infrastructure and 
institutional capacity that will allow them to expand trade 
with each other and with their great and dynamic neigh-
bors and thus to develop their potential as an East-West 
and North-South hub. 
Great barriers still stand in the way of effective 
trade and transit in, with and through the region, and 
estimates show that reducing these barriers from their 
current exceptionally high levels could result in signifi-
cant benefits. For Central Asia the UNPD and ADB have 
estimated that effective regional trade integration could 
lead to a doubling of Central Asian GDP over 10 years. 
(UNDP 2005, Asian Development Bank, 2006) For this to 
take place each country would need to improve its own 
institutions and policy regime, but concerted action by 
all countries as part of an effort of regional cooperation 
would also be needed. Regional cooperation could and 
should take place in a number of priority areas, including 
not only trade and transport, but also water and energy, 
environment, migration, and natural disaster prepared-
ness. (UNDP 2005)  
To date, not much progress has been made in devel-
oping regional cooperation mechanisms. For Central 
Asia, there has been a lot of talk about fostering regional 
cooperation since independence and various regional 
organizations have been created to support these efforts 
(SCO, EurAsEC, ECO, CAREC, SPECA, etc.)6 However, 
they remain mostly quite ineffective. SCO and CAREC 
appear to have the greatest potential for developing 
into effective platforms for regional cooperation. But as 
Martha Olcott demonstrates in her background paper 
for the First Emerging Markets Forum on the political 
economy of the region, the history and present political 
reality of Central Asia is such that competition among 
countries and leaders dominates and China and Russia 
generally favor bilateral arrangements. This impedes for 
now most regional and external efforts to create coop-
erative approaches and institutions. 
For the Caucasus the picture is even less 
6    The acronyms translate into: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian 
Economic Community, Economic Cooperation Organization, Central Asia Regional Eco-
nomic Cooperation Program, and Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia. For 
a description of these organizations, including their membership and mandates, as well as 
a summary assessment of their see Linn and Pidufala (2008).
Source: World Bank, 2008
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encouraging. The frozen conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorny Karabakh, 
the continuing tensions between Georgia and Russia 
and between Georgia and its breakaway provinces of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the closed border 
between Armenia and Turkey remain major obstacles 
to regional cooperation. Many efforts have been made 
also in the Caucasus to settle the conflicts and cre-
ate regional initiatives and structures, but these have 
been at best very partial in geographic coverage and 
negligible in their impact. (Vasilyan 2006) The recent 
rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey gives 
some hope for an eventual thaw in their bilateral relations 
and an opening of their border. And new investments 
in infrastructure (including a railway line from Turkey to 
Azerbaijan through Georgia, and construction of a new 
road link from Georgia through Armenia to Iran funded 
by the ADB) are signs of possible improvements in 
regional economic links. 
Questions for further exploration include the 
following:
•	 Is there any hope that the countries of the Central 
Asia and Caucasus region will cooperate with 
each other in significant ways in the foreseeable 
future?
•	 What are the priority areas for potential coopera-
tion and integration and for which countries?
•	 What should be done if some countries stand 
aside and pursue policies of self-isolation and 
obstruction? 
•	 What are suitable institutional responses to the 
need for cooperation and what lessons, if any, 
apply from other regions (e.g., the EU)?
•	 Is there anything the international community can 
do bilaterally or through multilateral channels to 
reduce the scope for conflict and help the coun-
tries turn from competition to cooperation?
•	 What can be learned from the Swiss experience?
Issue 4: How to reap maximum benefits from 
region’s energy and water resources for the 
countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus?
The Central Asia and Caucasus region has great natural 
resource endowments, among them especially energy 
and water, but these resources are unevenly distributed 
across countries. During Soviet days, central plan-
ning directed and coordinated investments and use 
of resources across all of Central Asia, mostly for the 
benefit of the Soviet Union as a whole. 
As documented in Martha Olcott’s background 
paper on energy for the First Eurasian Emerging Market 
Forum the region’s oil and gas resources were part of 
the integrated Soviet energy system and reached world 
markets through the pipeline infrastructure oriented 
towards the Soviet industrial heartland and Western 
Europe. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
Russia has aimed and largely been able to maintain its 
monopoly over transit routes for oil and gas from Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. However, this monopoly has 
begun to erode in recent years as Central Asian coun-
tries have started to develop alternative transport links. 
The first one was the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, 
later followed by a gas pipeline partly along the same 
route. Kazakhstan has begun to develop oil pipelines 
to China, and Turkmenistan just opened a gas pipeline 
also to China. Other export routes are under considera-
tion, including further routes towards Western Europe 
bypassing Russia (Nabucco) and towards South Asia. 
However, for now in the face of European bickering 
about a common energy security policy the major threat 
to the Russian monopoly over Central Asian energy tran-
sit appears to be China, rather than Western Europe or 
South Asia. In the long term, energy transit and markets 
are likely to be more rather than less integrated for the 
Eurasian continent as a whole, including possible over-
land oil and gas transport lines from the Middle East 
to East and South Asia. Since much of these will cross 
more than one border, regional and sub-regional agree-
























































energy transit routes. 
The sharing of the rights to the energy resources 
under the Caspian Sea remains an unresolved issue 
among the concerned Central Asian states (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) as well as Iran and 
Russia, although this has not stopped the exploration 
and extraction of oil and gas from the Caspian seabed. 
However, the continuing uncertainties have slowed down 
development in some quadrants of the sea and have 
been a source of continuing friction among some of the 
riparians. A key question currently facing Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan, as well as their Western partners, is 
whether to develop a trans-Caspian gas pipeline that 
would link Turkmenistan’s gas fields directly to Western 
markets.
Central Asia is endowed with large water and hydro-
energy resources. Soviet engineers had constructed 
huge reservoirs in the upstream republics (Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan) and major irrigation schemes in 
the downstream republics (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan), so as to permit the conversion of large 
tracts of desert into vast cotton fields. The intensive use 
of water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers led 
to the drying up of the Aral Sea in a matter of decades, 
causing a major ecological disaster of historic propor-
tions. (UNDP 2005)
At the same time a regional power grid was estab-
lished and allowed the region-wide distribution of hydro-
electricity generated in the system. A core feature of this 
system was to restrict the generation and use of hydro 
power in the winter, so as to store up water for irrigation 
use in the summer. Upstream republics were rewarded 
for restricting the release of water – and hence power 
generation when they needed it most – during the winter 
months by the provision of gas, coal and oil fuel from the 
down stream republics. 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union the coordina-
tion and barter mechanisms that had kept the system 
operating were severely interrupted. In their place, 
increasingly un-coordinated activities took over and 
technically and economically suboptimal outcomes 
prevailed, resulting simultaneously in great waste and 
underdevelopment of water and energy resources. 
(UNDP 2005, Linn 2006, Linn 2008a). Aside from the 
long-term issue of effective water and energy manage-
ment, the breakdown in regional cooperation also 
created the potential for conflict among the countries 
about the allocation and use of water among them, 
especially since downstream countries discontinued the 
provision of free fuel supply in the winter, which forced 
the upstream countries to release water for hydropower 
generation instead, thus reducing the amount of water 
available to downstream countries for irrigation in the 
summer. So far, this conflict potential has been con-
tained by ad hoc negotiations and agreements, but no 
longer-term solutions have yet been found.
An already complicated situation is further aggra-
vated by the fact that the region faces a potential 
short-term crisis of water, energy and food security due 
to a recurring regional drought condition (Linn 2008b). 
Moreover, the potential impact of global warming on 
the region adds another layer of uncertainty and pos-
sibly serious risk, since it may threaten the survival of 
Central Asia’s extensive glacier system and hence its 
supply of water for irrigation and hydro energy. (Eurasia 
Development Bank 2009) Pervasive shortages of water 
and electric power would seriously undermine the eco-
nomic development of the region and could give rise to 
interstate conflict.
Efforts have been made by Central Asian countries, 
by regional organizations and by international financial 
institutions to support more effective and cooperative 
approaches to the management of water and energy 
resources. This includes the Aral Sea Basin Program 
supported by international donors; the regional water 
sharing agreements among key countries in the region; 
the regional energy strategy being developed under the 
auspices of CAREC (CAREC 2008a)7 and most recently 
7    CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program) is a unique 
regional program in which eight countries and six international organizations participate: 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan; and Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 

























































the efforts of the international community to assess the 
current threats to regional prosperity and stability from a 
possible crisis of water, energy and food security (UNDP 
2009). 
While there are great opportunities for and benefits 
from improved regional energy and water development 
in Central Asia, there are also great political, technical 
and financial obstacles.  Ultimately governments have 
to work with each other, with private investors and with 
users to ensure effective solutions. The CAREC Energy 
Sector Strategy lays out the rationale and principles for 
cooperative development of these energy resources and 
identifies priority investment projects (over $20 billion), 
technical assistance initiatives ($13 million) and institution 
building requirements. Some key investments under the 
strategy are in an advanced stage of preparation, includ-
ing the Central Asia-South Asia 1,000 KWh power trans-
mission line (known as “CASA 1000”), which is expected 
to permit electricity exports from Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, 
recent developments have not been good: The CASA 
1000 project is slow to take off due in part to security 
concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and very recently 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan opted out of the Central 
Asia regional electricity grid, in effect ending one of the 
main regional cooperative arrangements held over from 
Soviet times and endangering the crucial winter supplies 
of power for Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
Questions for further exploration include the 
following:
•	 Will Russian efforts to maintain a monopoly over 
transit of Central Asian oil and gas resources 
succeed? Which alternative export routes – to 
Western Europe, to China or to South Asia – are 
the main alternative options?
•	 If regional cooperation on energy and water 
resource management is so important, why has 
so little actually happened? 
•	 What can national and international action do to 
enhance the chances of cooperation in these two 
key areas?
•	 What institutional approaches might be helpful 
in addressing the water and energy issues of 
Central Asia? What lessons are available from 
other regions, including the experience of riparian 
agreements for Lake Constance and the Rhine?
Issue 5: How to facilitate trade and tran-
sit within the region and with the major 
neighbors?
In the Soviet Union transport and trade connections, 
although economically inefficient, were highly integrated. 
After the breakup of the Union, intra-regional trade col-
lapsed and only partially revived among the new repub-
lics following independence. At the same time, however, 
trade with the rest of the world picked up and developed 
rapidly, especially after 2000. The background paper by 
Richard Pomfret tracks the changes in trade relations, 
policies and prospects, with a special focus on Central 
Asia. 
Three major factors combine to impede or support 
trade: trade policy (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, etc.), trans-
port infrastructure and trade facilitation along the major 
transport routes. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
trade policy is relatively non-distortive (although there 
are important exceptions, esp. Uzbekistan). Transport 
infrastructure is generally well developed, due to heavy 
investments by the Soviets, but much of it was focused 
on connecting each republic with Moscow rather than 
with other republics or other neighbors. Hence there are 
major bottlenecks, including in connections with China, 
South Asia and Iran. Most important, there are serious 
weaknesses in trade and transit facilitation (border 
crossings, customs, country internal check points and 
harassment, weak logistics, etc.) that need to be urgently 
addressed. And some borders are closed entirely 
(Armenia/Azerbaijan) or partially (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan). 
According to UNDP and ADB estimates, costs and time 
requirements of shipping goods to and from Central Asia 
could be halved if standard trade facilitation practices 
























































were made. (UNDP 2005, ADB 2006) 
These issues are the subject of a regional transport 
and trade facilitation strategy and action plan which was 
prepared under the auspices of CAREC and approved 
by ministers in November 2007 (CAREC, 2008b). One 
of the key innovations of this strategy is to develop 
a network of priority corridors in Central Asia, linked 
with Eurasia-wide corridors, by improving transport 
infrastructure and trade facilitation through concerted 
inter-governmental action and by monitoring progress in 
terms of reduced costs and time requirements along the 
corridors. 
The CAREC Implementation Action Plan for the 
Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy, which was 
approved by ministers in November 2008 (CAREC 
2008b), identifies a set of priority investment projects 
and technical assistance initiatives to be implemented 
over the next ten years for improvement of the multi-
modal transport network (roads, rail, ports and air) as 
well as for improvements in border crossing, transit and 
logistics management along the priority corridors. The 
Action Plan also envisages an in-depth monitoring of 
reductions in transport cost and time along the corridors 
in order to ensure that the investments actually bring 
the intended benefits. The financing of these ambitious 
initiatives ($21 billion for investments and $69 million 
for technical assistance) will come from countries’ own 
resources, from loans and grants by the multilateral 
institutions, and from other external financing, possibly 
involving public-private partnerships. An outstanding 
example for the kind of initiative is the planned multi-
billion dollar investment in CAREC Corridor 1b, which 
will link Kazakhstan (and other Central Asian countries) 
with China to the East and with Russia and Europe to 
the West. Financing for this corridor is being provided by 
EBRD, IsDB, Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and World Bank.
There are risks and challenges to this strategy and 
action plan. They relate to effective implementation, 
financing and development of institutional capaci-
ties. As long as governance is weak in the countries 
implementation, especially of trade facilitation measures, 
will remain weak. And political obstacles may keep uni-
versal adoption of shared rules and practices (especially 
at the border crossings) from being implemented. The 
recent suspension by Uzbekistan of its membership in 
EurAsEC is a reminder of some of these difficulties.
In the case of the Caucasus no overarching regional 
transport and trade facilitation plan as yet exists, 
because of the continuing deadlock between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh. Moreover, 
Turkey’s borders with Armenia remain closed for now, 
and Georgia’s trade with its breakaway provinces and 
Russia are severely curtailed. Bilateral improvements in 
transport infrastructure investments (Azerbaijan-Georgia 
road, Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey rail, and Georgia-
Armenia-Iran road) are promising, but at best partial 
improvements in key regional transport links. 
Two new aspects deserve mentioning: First, the 
Central Asia Strategy of the European Union which was 
adopted in 2007 stresses the integration of transport 
and trade links between Europe and Central Asia espe-
cially through the Caucasus as one of its key elements. 
However, as Emerson and Vinokurov (2009) point out 
this will require revision of the EU’s transport network 
plan (originally developed under the acronym TRASECA) 
to achieve effective connectivity with the network of cor-
ridors for Central Asia developed by CAREC. Second, as 
Kuchins et al. (2009) point out, the recent strengthening 
of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) developed 
by NATO for its northern supply routes to Afghanistan 
(as an alternative to the increasingly hazardous supply 
routes through Pakistan), while motivated by the needs 
of logistical support for NATO’s military engagement 
in Afghanistan, may also help develop and improve 
the commercial transcontinental transport and trade 
routes from the Baltics through Russia and Central Asia 
to Afghanistan, as well as from the Black Sea through 
Georgia and Azerbaijan.

























































•	 Is it possible for long distance transport over land 
to compete with shipment by sea or air? Under 
which circumstances, for which commodities?
•	 What is the right solution when some countries 
keep closed borders or otherwise do not wish to 
participate in regional schemes to enhance trade 
and communication?
•	 What are the lessons from Europe (including 
South-East Europe) for Central Asia and the 
Caucasus for improving trade, trade-facilitation 
and transport?
•	 How can transport and trade corridors be con-
verted in economic corridors? 
•	 How to develop public private partnership 
approaches to finance important infrastructure 
investments?
•	 How will the current global economic crisis and its 
impact on Central Asia and the Caucasus affect 
the investment plans for regional transport and 
trade facilitation?
Issue 6:  What can be done to improve the 
private business climate in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus?
As Dennis de Tray points out in his background paper for 
the First Eurasian Emerging Market Forum, most coun-
tries in Central Asia and the Caucasus suffer from the 
double handicap of being small and land-locked. Under 
these conditions, if countries want to attract private 
investment as a foundation for sustained growth, it is 
essential that their business climate is above average in 
order to compensate for the inherent constraints of size 
and locations which they face. 
The countries in the region generally have a reputa-
tion of possessing a poor to very poor business climate 
(see, for example, UNDP 2005). And while there are 
some differences in rating and ranking depending on 
which business climate index is used, and there are 
considerable differences across countries in the region, 
the overall conclusion has to be that governments need 
to focus much more systematically on creating a stable, 
open, business-friendly investment climate, comple-
mented by improvements in transport and trade facilita-
tion, energy and water infrastructure, all underpinned by 
overall improvements in governance.
Central Asia and the Caucasus generally have cen-
tralized and autocratic political systems in which govern-
mental accountability and transparency are weak, civil 
society is underdeveloped (with the exception of Georgia 
and Kyrgyz Republic), the business community does 
not provide a strong voice for better governance, and 
the media do not function as an effective check on poor 
public sector management. As a result, their political 
and economic transformation, corruption and political 
freedom indexes are relatively poor. All of these factors 
feed back into a poor investment climate perception and 
reality for private business, both domestic and foreign. 
Finally, poor governance affects all the other areas and 
issues discussed above, since under conditions of poor 
governance it is difficult to manage improvements in 
sectoral policies and institutions and to forge strong 
and lasting regional cooperation arrangements.  And of 
course, a poor investment climate in one country has 
negative spill-over effects in neighboring countries and 
hence reduces growth and diversification of the econo-
mies concerned. (UNDP 2005)
The countries of Central Asian and the Caucasus 
also face special problems because of their abundant 
natural resources. With high resource rents at the 
disposal of governments and/or private investors, the 
competition for a share of the resource endowments 
will be inevitable and governments will be under great 
pressure to act in a discretionary and even corrupt man-
ner. (Linn 2008c) In short, high resource endowments 
tend to weaken governance and can easily undermine 
the quality of economic institutions and management. 
This is now generally recognized to be at the core of 
the so-called “natural resource curse”. Close adherence 
to the rules of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) can help, as does establishment of natural 

























































(Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), but by no means all, are 
following these approaches.
Questions for further exploration include the 
following:
•	 What is the reality of the business environment in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus? Is it as bad as its 
reputation?
•	 What are the best ways to improve the business 
climate country-by-country and region-wide?
•	 How can private business and civil society best 
exert their influence to improve the business 
climate, public administration and governance in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus?
•	 Is the link between political system and public 
sector governance a strong one? I.e., can authori-
tarian regimes as they are prevalent in Central 
Asia and less so in the Caucasus, provide cred-
ible assurances that they will improve economic 
governance and the investment climate?
•	 Is there much that outsiders can do to help 
improve a country’s governance and investment 
climate?
Other Potential Issues
Central Asia and the Caucasus face other important 
issues.8 They include the following:
1.  Capital market and financial integration: The 
current economic crisis has shown that financial 
integration has costs as well as benefits. It will 
be a challenge for the countries in the region 
to manage effectively the process of further 
financial integration, with appropriate develop-
ment and regulation of the national financial 
markets and institutions and with harmonization 
of macroeconomic and financial policies across 
borders. 
2.  Agricultural development and link to food 
8  Many of them were explored in the UNDP’s Central Asia Human Develop-
ment Report (UNDP 2005) for Central Asia.
security: Especially the poorer countries of 
the region still depend heavily on agriculture. 
And raising the productivity of the agricultural 
sectors is also a major challenge for the energy 
exporting countries of the region as they try to 
diversify their economies. At the same time, 
more efficient use of scare water resources, 
especially in irrigated agriculture, and adequate 
food security for their populations are important 
tasks for the region’s policy makers.
3.  The human development challenge: The 
republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
had relatively highly developed human capital in 
terms of education and health conditions, when 
the Soviet Union collapsed. The public educa-
tion and health systems in the region have since 
taken a severe beating, with private providers 
offering only a partial and imperfect substitute. 
For the region’s long-term development, it will 
be critical that education and health services 
are upgraded significantly.
4.  Environmental, climate change and natural 
disaster threats: Central Asia and the Caucasus 
face high risks of environmental damage, much 
of this the legacy of the bad environmental 
management during the times of the Former 
Soviet Union and neglect of important environ-
mental challenges. Climate change also may 
affect the region severely, especially through 
the impact on the snow cover and glaciers in 
the high mountain ranges, which provide for 
the region’s life-sustaining water supply. Finally, 
the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
face major natural disaster risks, especially from 
major earthquakes. These issues require greater 
domestic policy focus and stronger institutional 


























































Central Asia and the Caucasus make up an important 
region of the world, which deserves more attention and 
understanding than it generally receives from the diplo-
matic and development communities around the globe. 
A stable and prosperous Central Asian and Caucasus 
region is a key factor for a successful integration of the 
Eurasian continental economy and is in the interest of 
all major geopolitical actors, including China, Europe, 
Russia and the U.S.A. This overview paper identified 
some key issues facing this region that represent both 
opportunities and challenges. Ideally, the countries 
would work individually and together to make the most 
of these opportunities. Given the many interdependen-
cies between the countries in water, energy, transport 
and private sector development, among others, a 
cooperative approach holds many opportunities for win-
win outcomes. However, as the background papers for 
the First Eurasia Emerging Markets Forum demonstrate 
many obstacles – physical, economic, governance and 
political – stand in the way of such cooperation. In and 
of itself this is not surprising or unusual. There are few 
examples of close and effective regional cooperation 
and organization around the world. Indeed, much of 
what we now observe in the region is the result of a 
sense of pride in a newly acquired national sovereignty 
and of a quite common competition among neighboring 
countries. The risk is that the unwillingness to share 
any aspect of sovereignty and the urge to indulge in 
competitive maneuvers, especially when combined with 
a struggle for control over shared regional resources and 
with poor governance and interpersonal rivalries among 
leaders, will create significant barriers to the natural 
forces of economic integration and worse yet erupt into 
instances of open conflict. 
While the scope for external engagement in pushing 
for closer regional cooperation is limited, the interna-
tional community can assist the countries in the region 
in many ways to find a suitable and sustainable path 
of development through appropriate national policies 
and where possible regional cooperation, despite the 
immediate challenges of the global financial crisis and 
competing interests within the region and among the 
international partners. It will take time – decades at least 
–, diplomatic ingenuity, financial resources and much 
patience and good will if the ultimate goal of a stable and 
prosperous Central Asia and Caucasus region at the 




















































































Armenia 10.3 3.1  0.798 (84) 72 98 6,310
Azerbaijan 33.2 8.7 0.787 (86) 67 101 7,770
Georgia 10.8 4.4 0.778  (89) 71 92 4,850
Kazakhstan 96.2 15.7 0.804 (82) 66 104 9,690
Kyrgyz Rep. 3.9 5.3 0.710 (120)  68 95 2,140
Tajikistan 4.1 6.8 0.688 (127) 67 95 1,860
Turkmenistan 14.3 5.0 0.739 (109) 63 n.a. 6,210
Uzbekistan 24.7 27.3 0.710 (119) 67 97 2,660
Mongolia 4.4 2.6 0.727 (115) 67 110 3,480
Russia 1,364.5 141.8 0.817 (71) 68 99 15,636
Hungary 128.6 10.0 0.879 (43) 73 96 17,790
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2009 and UNDP Human Development Report 2009
Selected Social Indicators for Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2007-2008
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